In the early hours of June 17, 1972, five masked men entered the Watergate Office Building, carrying all kinds of burglary tools: surgical gloves to hide fingerprints, tear gas guns to stun the unexpected, and shortwave transmitters to detect police radio chatter.1 (Note 1: Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, All the President’s Men (Simon & Schuster, 1974), 15-16.) Their target lay on the sixth floor—the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee.2 (Note 2: Ibid., 14.) But this was no robbery. In an act of unimaginable unscrupulousness at the highest level of American political life, these five—led by a certain Committee to Re-elect the President—aimed to wiretap the offices of their political opposition.3 (Note 3: Justin P. Coffey, “Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President” (Laramie, University of Wyoming, 1998), https://www.proquest.com/openview/febb6e55ab3977179ec276688e2377b1, 21, accessed June 24, 2023.) And if not for one observant security guard, they may very well have succeeded.4 (Note 4: Ibid., 11.)
The arrest of these five men set in motion a cataclysm that saw Richard Nixon resign and a nation upended. All the while, Americans watched, read, and listened to that cataclysm closely as it was uncovered, as congressional hearings and court proceedings were broadcast gavel to gavel.5 (Note 5: Amanda Reichenbach, “‘Gavel-to-Gavel’: The Watergate Scandal and Public Television,” American Archive of Public Broadcasting, n.d., https://americanarchive.org/exhibits/watergate, accessed June 27, 2023.) This was a muckraker’s paradise, where brave journalists and bold headlines took centre stage. Indeed, Watergate made heroes out of two journalists, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein—Davids armed only with the truth against the duplicitous Nixonian Goliath.6 (Note 6: Michael Schudsen, Watergate in American Memory: How We Remember, Forget, and Reconstruct the Past (Perseus Books Group, 1993), 104.) Their Pulitzer Prize-winning investigatory contributions, including the bestseller book and later film adaptation, All the President’s Men, continues to shape the public narrative—if not the historical narrative—of the media’s pivotal role in bringing down a President.7 (Note 7: Ibid., 104.)
Understanding the media in respect to the defence of democratic institutions has never been more important. For decades, Watergate as an attack on the democratic process stood alone, but that is no longer the case: June 17, 1972 now shares its pedestal of infamy with January 6, 2021. To that end, this essay will explore the Watergate scandal to answer one question: how did the media shape Watergate, and vice versa? Overall, the media as a whole contributed little to the investigation, acting primarily as a medium through which revelations uncovered by internal governmental efforts—the FBI investigations, the courts, the whistleblowers and the congressional committees—were communicated to the public. It was these governmental efforts—not the media’s reporting—that ended Nixon’s presidency. Despite this, Watergate’s legacy remains one of deep skepticism of government as a whole: the media cast itself as an external force for truth and transparency, thrusting itself into the separation of powers as a fourth actor beyond the legislature, judiciary and executive.
Watergate neither began nor ended with the break-in; rather, Watergate arguably began with the media—in the form of the Pentagon Papers leak. In 1967, U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara began to reach the same conclusion as increasingly many Americans: that American policies in Southeast Asia—particularly its military intervention in Vietnam—had failed.8 (Note 8: Mai Elliott, RAND in Southeast Asia: A History of the Vietnam War Era (RAND Corporation, 2010), https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/cp564rc, 415, accessed June 27, 2023.) “Scholars,” as McNamara states in his memoirs, “would undoubtedly want to know why.”9 (Note 9: Robert McNamara and Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (Times Books, Random House, 1995), 280.) On June 17, 1967, a team of researchers and analysts began gathering documents to answer that question. Objectivity was key to the endeavour’s scholarly usefulness; “tell your researchers not to hold back,” said McNamara to John McNaughton, then-director of the task force, and “let the chips fall where they may.”10 (Note 10: Ibid., 280.)
The result was a damning 7,000-page report, later known as the Pentagon Papers. According to historian John Prados, this document “demonstrated beyond questioning the criticisms that antiwar activists had been making…were not wrong but, in fact, were not materially different from things that had been argued inside the U.S. government.”11 (Note 11: Jordan Moran, “Nixon and the Pentagon Papers,” Miller Center, n.d., https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-resources/first-domino-nixon-and-the-pentagon-papers, accessed June 27, 2023.) Daniel Ellsberg, a major contributor to the development of the Pentagon Papers, took its prescriptions to heart: once a hawk, Ellsberg turned dove, believing that the Vietnam War “should be ended and that above all must not be escalated.”12 (Note 12: Elliott, RAND in Southeast Asia, 430.) However, it became clear that numerous administrations, from Truman to Eisenhower to Kennedy to Johnson, had systemically lied about the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam; the public deserved to know.13 (Note 13: Neil Sheehan, “Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing U. S. Involvement,” The New York Times, June 13, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/13/archives/vietnam-archive-pentagon-study-traces-3-decades-of-growing-u-s.html, accessed June 26, 2023.)
In October of 1969, Ellsberg planned to leak the Pentagon Papers to an anti-war senator “who[m] he hoped would hold hearings and thereby shift the onus of the release from him.”14 (Note 14: Ibid.) All refused, including William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and George McGovern, who would eventually run for president against Nixon in 1972.15 (Note 15: Ibid.) Unable to find a willing senator, Ellsberg sent copies to a think tank, the Institute for Policy Studies, but only in a partial and piecemeal fashion as he “feared that its liberal bent would taint the historic impact of what the study contained.”16 (Note 16: Ibid.) Only then were the Pentagon Papers leaked to the press, and not by Ellsberg himself; rather, in 1970, Marcus Raskin—co-founder of the Institute for Policy Studies—had surreptitiously compiled its fragmentary contents and given it to the New York Times.17 (Note 17: Ibid.) Ellsberg was not informed.18 (Note 18: Ibid.) In 1971, Raskin convinced Ellsberg to send the Pentagon Papers in their entirety to the New York Times, which was—still unknown to Ellsberg—already in partial possession of it.19 (Note 19: Ibid.)
Popular recollection of the Pentagon Papers leak tends to omit much of Ellsberg’s attempts to work with the legislative branch in favour of an abridged sequence of events: Ellsberg photocopied the Pentagon Papers and leaked them directly to the press. This is far from what happened in reality; leaking to the media was not Ellsberg’s first choice, or even his second choice, and for good reason. Congressional oversight is a key component of the separation of powers, and there are established mechanisms for protecting congressmen should doing so bring them into conflict with the executive branch.20 (Note 20: “Overview of Congress’s Investigation and Oversight Powers,” Constitution Annotated, n.d., https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C18-7-1/ALDE_00013657/, accessed June 26, 2023.) Had any senator agreed to work with Ellsberg, and by doing so introduce the Pentagon Papers into the Congressional Record, they would have been protected by congressional immunity.21 (Note 21: “Overview of Speech or Debate Clause,” Constitution Annotated, n.d., https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S6-C1-3-1/ALDE_00013300/#ALDF_00022440, accessed June 26, 2023.)
In contrast, the First Amendment rights of the press to publish classified documents—and to what extent that right was subject to the “maintenance of an effective national defense requir[ing] both confidentiality and secrecy”—had yet to be clearly established by legal precedence; this would only be established after publication by New York Times Co. v. United States.22 (Note 22: New York Times Co. v. United States, 713 U.S. 403 (U.S. Supreme Court 1971).) The precedence set here would enshrine the media as another mechanism by which holding the executive to account could occur in spite of legal repercussions. Until then, however, the Nixon administration would extensively pursue both legal and illegal means to suppress both the media and Ellsberg. These efforts would eventually culminate in broader efforts to stymie political opposition, leading directly to Watergate.
The New York Times began to publish excerpts of the leaked Pentagon Papers on June 13, 1971.23 (Note 23: Sheehan, “Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing U. S. Involvement.”) The Pentagon Papers were not politically damaging to Nixon; on the contrary, they largely implicated the Democratic administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson—Nixon being a Republican.24 (Note 24: Ibid.) Nevertheless, as Nixon recalled, “there was every reason to believe this was a security leak of unprecedented proportions.”25 (Note 25: “Presidential Statements on the Watergate Break-in and Its Investigation” (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), https://books.google.ca/books?id=ZOo1AAAAIAAJ&pg, 23, accessed June 26, 2023.) Within a week, he authorized the formation of the Special Investigations Unit; its purpose, according to Nixon himself, “was to stop security leaks and to investigate other sensitive security matters.”26 (Note 26: Ibid.) John Ehrlichman was assigned to supervise this endeavour; in turn, he appointed Egil Krogh to lead it directly.27 (Note 27: Ibid.) This unit would come to be known colloquially as the “White House Plumbers,” in reference to their role in combating information leaks.28 (Note 28: “The Plumbers,” The New York Times, July 22, 1973, https://www.nytimes.com/1973/07/22/archives/the-plumbers.html, accessed June 26, 2023.) Indeed, failing to punish the leak’s perpetrators would set a terrible precedent as Nixon’s main concern was that it would compromise his administration’s ability to effectively pursue foreign relations.29 (Note 29: “Presidential Statements on the Watergate Break-in and Its Investigation,” 23.) This belief was proved correct by another leak on July 23, 1971.30 (Note 30: Donald W. Stewart, “SALT I Leaks vs. SALT II Leaks.” (Central Intelligence Agency, July 1979), https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360094-9.pdf, accessed June 27, 2023.) That the New York Times was again involved only “added insult to injury” for Nixon.31 (Note 31: Stanley Kutler, Abuse of Power (Simon & Schuster, 1997), 8.) Here, the New York Times exposed the United States’ fallback position during the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union, placing Nixon at a disadvantage and threatening to sabotage negotiations altogether.32 (Note 32: Ibid.) This leak marked a turning point for the Plumbers; “new urgency” was attached to their work as a result.33 (Note 33: “The Plumbers.”)
“As a matter of first priority,” Nixon said to Krogh, “the [Special Investigations] unit should find out all it could about Mr. Ellsberg’s associates and his motives.”34 (Note 34: “Presidential Statements on the Watergate Break-in and Its Investigation,” 23.) And so, they did: the Plumbers launched an investigation into Ellsberg, separate from the ongoing investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigations.35 (Note 35: “The Plumbers.”) As part of the Plumbers’ investigation, they illegally wiretapped Ellsberg and Neil Sheehan, the New York Times reporter who received the Pentagon Papers.36 (Note 36: Ibid.) But increasingly the Plumbers’ efforts turned to Ellsberg himself, turning from investigatory to political.37 (Note 37: Ibid.) Fearing that Ellsberg would be “martyred” if prosecuted by the Nixon administration, the Plumbers aimed to gather information to damage his credibility.38 (Note 38: Ibid.) On September 3, 1971, operatives of the Plumbers—two of whom would later participate in the Watergate burglary—broke into the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, to acquire a psychological profile. These efforts demonstrated a ruthless willingness on the part of the Plumbers to advance the interests of the Nixon administration—regardless of legality.
Overall, the Nixon administration’s extreme response to the Pentagon Papers leak is key to understanding Nixon’s fraught relationship with the media. During his impeachment, Nixon’s written statements to Congress asserted that he “did not authorize and had no knowledge of any illegal means to be used” to suppress the publication of the Pentagon Papers.39 (Note 39: “Presidential Statements on the Watergate Break-in and Its Investigation,” 23.) However, his response to New York Times Co. v. United States implies otherwise:
Do you think, for Christ sakes, that the New York Times is worried about all the legal niceties? Those sons of…are killing me…we’re up against an enemy, a conspiracy. They’re using any means. We are going to use any means…the press now is putting their right to make money, to profit, to profit from publication of stolen documents under the First Amendment and that overrides the right of an American who is fighting for his country…I know how this game is played.40 (Note 40: Kutler, Abuse of Power, 8.)
Such was the enmity Nixon had for the media; to some extent, it was personal, and featured prominently throughout his political career. Nixon attributed negative media coverage to his loss in the 1962 California gubernatorial election: “You won’t have Nixon to kick around anymore,” he said to a crowd of reporters; “all members of the press are so delighted that I lost.”41 (Note 41: Peter Kaye, “Nixon Bows Out With Jab At Press,” The San Diego Union, November 8, 1962, https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/local-history/story/2022-11-08/from-the-archives-nixons-last-press-conference-in-1962-took-jabs-at-the-press, accessed June 28, 2023.) Eventually, Nixon’s hostility towards journalists evolved from a personal feud to a shrewd political tactic. Under Nixon, ‘the press’ became “the media”—a less favourable phrase that was aimed at dismissing negative coverage.42 (Note 42: Martin F. Nolan, “Orwell Meets Nixon: When and Why ‘the Press’ Became ‘the Media,’” The International Journal of Press/Politics 10, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 69–83, 72.) Journalist Martin F. Nolan goes as far to compare this change in wording to Orwellian newspeak: “‘Media’ was just such a grand Latinism, an apt word for those seeking to create a grand conspiracy.”43 (Note 43: Ibid., 78.)
Hostility to the media eventually found its place within the broader context of Nixon’s overarching political strategy. In his 1968 speech accepting the Republican presidential nomination, Nixon defined his constituency as the “the forgotten Americans—the non-shouters, the non-demonstrators.”44 (Note 44: Richard Nixon, “Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention” (Miami Beach, August 8, 1968), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/256650, accessed June 28, 2023.) The national media’s perceived sympathy to the anti-war counterculture increasingly alienated these “non-shouters” and “non-demonstrators”—in more familiar terms, Nixon’s “silent majority.”45 (Note 45: Stanley Kutler, The Wars Of Watergate: The Last Crisis Of Richard Nixon (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1990), 86-89.) That year, liberal Washington Post columnist Joseph Kraft conceded that media coverage was often biased towards “young people [and] minority groups.”46 (Note 46: Joseph Kraft, “Daley and Police Have a Point in Claiming Press Is Biased,” The Washington Post, September 3, 1968, sec., as quoted in Christopher Cimaglio, “‘A Tiny and Closed Fraternity of Privileged Men’: The Nixon-Agnew Antimedia Campaign and the Liberal Roots of the U.S. Conservative ‘Liberal Media’ Critique,” International Journal of Communications 10, no. 1 (2016), https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/2633, 4-5.) Indeed, attacking the media also found salience in supporting Nixon’s ‘Southern Strategy,’ which aimed to capitalize on the Democratic Party’s support for the Civil Rights Act to attract disaffected white Southerners to the Republican side.47 (Note 47: Christopher Cimaglio, “‘A Tiny and Closed Fraternity of Privileged Men,’” 4, accessed June 28, 2023.)
Further reinforcing Nixon’s rhetoric, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew delivered a fiery condemnation of the media at a Des Moines Republican party conference; both scholars and modern commentators point to this speech as a “foundational moment for the conservative critique of liberal media bias in U.S. politics.”48 (Note 48: Ibid., 1.) According to Agnew:
The power of the networks…represents a concentration of power over American public opinion unknown in history…The American people would rightly not tolerate this kind of concentration of power in government. Is it not fair and relevant to question its concentration in the hands of a tiny and closed fraternity of privileged men, elected by no one, and enjoying a monopoly sanctioned and licensed by government?49 (Note 49: Spiro T. Agnew, “Television News Bias” (Des Moines, November 13, 1969), https://www.c-span.org/video/?322645-1/spiro-agnew-television-news-bias, accessed June 29, 2023.)
Overall, the Nixon administration’s electoral strategy increasingly asserted that this “closed fraternity” of out-of-touch New Yorkers and Washingtonians were staring down a widening credibility gap with the common American.50 (Note 50: Christopher Cimaglio, “‘A Tiny and Closed Fraternity of Privileged Men,’” 1.) If this line of reasoning sounds familiar, it is because accusations of a liberal media are today “one of the most successful and visible brands of media criticism in the United States.”51 (Note 51: Ibid., 2.)
But as modern commentators draw parallels with Nixon’s anti-media bent with that of today’s conservatism, often forgotten is that this hostility was quite mutual. Marvin Kalb, a journalist who ended up on Nixon’s infamous enemies list, conceded that “at one level, Watergate was a battle between a President and a newspaper.”52 (Note 52: Marvin Kalb, The Nixon Memo: Political Respectibility, Russia, and the Press (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 5-14, as quoted in Ruth P. Morgan, “Nixon, Watergate, and the Study of the Presidency,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 26, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 217–38, 220.) Another contemporary journalist noted the “bloodlust” his friends in the press had for Nixon: “All they seemed to be able to think of was ‘get him, get him, get him.’”53 (Note 53: Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 122, as quoted in Ruth P. Morgan, “Nixon, Watergate, and the Study of the Presidency,” 220.) Even as contemporary journalists acknowledged Nixon’s achievements, they often did so begrudgingly and reservedly, “fault[ing] his manner, style, and person.”54 (Note 54: Morgan, “Nixon, Watergate, and the Study of the Presidency,” 220.)
Understanding this mutually hostile dynamic between Nixon and the media is key to analyzing its eventual role in Nixon’s downfall. Ruth P. Morgan contends that “[h]ad the press liked Nixon, he might have been given the benefit of the doubt.”55 (Note 55: Ibid.) Instead, the media viewed Nixon through an “unforgiving lens.”56 (Note 56: Ibid.) Although the Plumbers’ clandestine activities regarding the Pentagon Papers leak “tapered off” after the Ellsberg break-in, many were quickly reassigned to overtly political work in the Committee to Re-elect the President (CRP).57 (Note 57: Kutler, Abuse of Power, 26-98.) There, the former Plumbers would bring their willingness for lawless machination to bear against Nixon’s political enemies in the 1972 presidential election. And when those machinations began to hound the President, the press would have the last “get.”
There is no shortage of primary sources on Watergate; many of its primary actors wrote extensive memoirs. But unlike the later events of Watergate, where the perpetrators’ accounts could be corroborated in part by taped recordings, congressional hearings, and whistleblowers, Nixon’s earlier presidency is far less documented by incontrovertible evidence. As such, one of the few scholarly attempts to establish a historical chronology of the CRP by Justin Coffey relies heavily on Nixon’s post-presidency autobiography, which was likely written in part to rehabilitate Nixon’s legacy. Nevertheless, Coffey asserts that the idea for a covert political arm began shortly into Nixon’s first term. Nixon had won the 1968 presidential election with a significant margin, with 301 electoral votes to Democrat Hubert Humphrey’s 191, but the Republican Party failed to capture the House or the Senate; in fact, Nixon would be the only president since Zachary Taylor in 1848 to govern without either chamber of Congress.58 (Note 58: Coffey, “Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President,” 4.) And despite Nixon’s wide lead in the presidential election, Democratic majorities in Congress were anything but slim: in 1968 Democrats led Republicans by 14 seats in the Senate and 51 seats in the House.59 (Note 59: “Party Division,” United States Senate, n.d., https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm; “Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present,” United States House of Representatives, n.d., https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/, accessed June 29, 2023.)
As Nixon’s legislative agenda stagnated, many contemporary pundits predicted he would be a one-term president.60 (Note 60: Coffey, “Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President,” 7.) The dismal results of the 1970 midterm elections “seemed only to confirm the gloomy forecasts of political pundits.”61 (Note 61: Ibid., 7.) Nothing could be left up to chance in the 1972 presidential election, lest Nixon confirmed the media’s prophesied one-term presidency. In response, Nixon sent a memo to his Chief of Staff, H. R. “Bob” Haldeman: his administration must “get politics out of the White House by introducing dynamic campaign management…or [by] setting up a special presidential re-election committee.”62 (Note 62: Ibid., 8-9.) Nixon chose the latter option: John Mitchell, Nixon’s Attorney General and “most trusted confidant,” would lead the committee, whereas Maurice Stans, Nixon’s Commerce Secretary, would serve as its Finance Chairman.63 (Note 63: Ibid., 9-10.) Mitchell and Stans would be powerful figures in the CRP, but their fervor would be surpassed by “an odd assortment of shady characters”—many of whom were former Plumbers—who would increasingly push the CRP in a radical and lawless direction.64 (Note 64: Ibid., 10.)
One such character, Gordon Liddy—who had participated in the Ellsberg break-in—would propose some of the most outrageous plans in the history of American electioneering. Chief among these sinister schemes was “Operation Gemstone,” which he pitched to Mitchell on January 27, 1972—a “$1 million political intelligence operation, which contemplated the use of electronic surveillance of political opponents, abduction of radical leaders, muggings, and the use of call girls.”65 (Note 65: “Events Prior to the Watergate Break-In” (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), https://books.google.ca/books?id=PYVXJ8P7DxIC, 53, accessed June 30, 2023.) Mitchell rejected this proposal.66 (Note 66: Ibid., 53.) Liddy would then propose a scaled-down version in March involving a break-in at the Democratic National Committee, which would be approved in some manner by the CRP, although whether Mitchell did so remains disputed.67 (Note 67: Coffey, “Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President,” 20; James D. Robenalt, “Who Approved the Watergate Break-in? Let’s Go to the Tapes,” The Washington Post, June 16, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/interactive/2022/haldeman-tapes-watergate-john-mitchell/, accessed June 30, 2023.) Regardless, Liddy’s operation was underway.
Its target was Chairman of the Democratic National Committee (DNC), Larry O’Brien, whose “pointed barbs at the Nixon White House” had won him a high position on Nixon’s list of enemies.68 (Note 68: Coffey, “Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President,” 20-21.) In fact, in the leadup to the 1972 presidential election, Nixon would constantly ask the CRP to take action against O’Brien.69 (Note 69: Ibid., 21.) To that end, Liddy and Howard Hunt—another former Plumber who also participated in the Ellsberg break-in—recruited five men to wiretap the DNC at the Watergate Office Building.70 (Note 70: Ibid.) These five men first entered the DNC and installed wiretaps in May, but they stopped working in early June. And so, in the early hours of June 17, five masked men were arrested in the Watergate Office in the burglary that once exposed by the press in the form of two Washington Post journalists—Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein—would bring down a President. But that narrative is far from what happened.
Later that morning, Woodward and Bernstein would receive a call from their editor at the Washington Post; they were to be assigned to a developing story about a break-in at the DNC.71 (Note 71: Woodward and Bernstein, All the President’s Men, 13.) At the time, both journalists had led somewhat insignificant careers. Woodward’s claim to fame was a series on the attempted assassination of George Wallace, Governor of Alabama, but he had done little beyond that. Bernstein was a college dropout who “occasionally wrote about rock music.”72 (Note 72: Ibid., 15.) In fact, that was what many observers viewed the Watergate break-in as: an insignificant event that would soon blow over, like most of Woodward and Bernstein’s earlier reporting had. Indeed, initial reactions to the burglary were largely muted. While O’Brien was quick to claim that the burglars were acting under the White House, other Democrats were less accusatory.73 (Note 73: Coffey, “Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President,” 13.) For example, Democratic Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield told journalists that he did not believe that the Nixon administration was involved.74 (Note 74: Ibid.) Apart from the Washington Post, most of the media was also unconvinced: The New York Times featured the story on its thirtieth page; NBC allotted it a mere ten seconds on that evening’s news broadcast; Newsweek gave it a rather flippant headline, “Capers.”75 (Note 75: Ibid., 14.)
Nixon claimed that he learned of the break-in the day after and held a similar view as the media. Nothing tied his administration to this “third rate burglary,” as his press secretary famously dismissed it as; Nixon’s reaction was initially “pragmatic and cool.”76 (Note 76: Ibid., 13.) But that changed quickly as the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police began their investigation in earnest. The burglars had rented rooms at a motel across the street from the Watergate Office Building; there, police discovered a check signed with Howard Hunt’s name and a notebook bearing the address “W. House.”77 (Note 77: Ibid., 12.) Under questioning the burglars admitted to working for the CRP under Hunt and Liddy—ironically now the committee’s legal counsel—to wiretap the DNC.78 (Note 78: Ibid.) By then, the FBI was called to take over the investigation, wiretapping being a federal crime.79 (Note 79: Ibid., 13.)
The FBI quickly made a startling breakthrough: one of the burglars, who had used a fake name when arraigned, was revealed to be James McCord, Chief of Security for the CRP.80 (Note 80: Ibid.) Now emerged conclusive evidence that tied the CRP to the burglary, as although CRP denied employing McCord, their own payroll records proved otherwise.81 (Note 81: Ibid.) As these revelations made their way to Nixon, panic set in. His re-election was jeopardized, and now key members of his administration faced potential criminal charges: Liddy and Hunt had close ties to the White House, and their long record of employment in the administration was undeniable.82 (Note 82: Ibid., 22.) “Unless we could find a way to limit the investigation,” wrote Nixon, “the trail would lead directly to CRP, and our political containment would go by the boards.”83 (Note 83: Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 640, as quoted in Coffey, “Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President,” 22.) His Chief of Staff, Bob Haldeman, had a plan to prevent that by claiming that the CRP’s break-in was a CIA operation; Nixon approved.84 (Note 84: Ibid., 23.) CIA involvement was a possibility the FBI was already considering given the involvement of Hunt and McCord—both of whom had served in the CIA in the past, and the FBI informed the White House that they had ended their investigation.85 (Note 85: Ibid.) “As far as I was concerned,” wrote Nixon in his memoirs, “this was the end to our worries about Watergate.”86 (Note 86: Nixon, RN, 642, as quoted in Coffey, “Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President,” 23.)
But the FBI did not end their investigation. Also worrying for Nixon was that new developments began to make it to the media—especially the “hated” Washington Post.87 (Note 87: Coffey, “Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President,” 23.) On August 26, 1972, just three days after Nixon was renominated as the Republican presidential candidate, the General Accounting Office released a report to the Washington Post requesting a Justice Department inquiry alleging “apparent and possible [financial] violations” made by the CRP.88 (Note 88: Bernard Gwertzman, “G.A.O. Report Asks Justice Inquiry Into G.O.P. Funds,” The Washington Post, August 27, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/08/27/archives/gao-report-asks-justice-inquiry-into-gop-funds-says-apparent.html, accessed June 30, 2023.) “They’ve got so much money,” remarked BusinessWeek, “that they don’t even count it. They weigh it.”89 (Note 89: “Color the Campaign Funds Green,” BusinessWeek, October 7, 1972, 36, as quoted in Coffey, “Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President,” 23.) That was not far from the truth: the CRP did not count their money, and nor did they weigh it. According to the GAO’s report, they laundered it: $350,000 in total had passed through a Mexican bank without any documentation.90 (Note 90: Gwertzman, “G.A.O. Report Asks Justice Inquiry Into G.O.P. Funds.”) Nixon’s response to the matter in a press conference was the height of equivocation: it was a “technical violation” that was occurring on “both sides.”91 (Note 91: Woodward and Bernstein, All the President’s Men, 57.) On October 10, Woodward and Bernstein exposed another appalling revelation: an anonymous FBI source, later revealed to be FBI Deputy Director Mark Felt, revealed that the FBI had discovered that much of the CRP’s laundered and unaccounted money was to finance “an extensive undercover campaign aimed at discrediting individual Democratic presidential candidates and disrupting their campaigns.”92 (Note 92: Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, “FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats,” The Washington Post, October 10, 1972, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/101072-1.htm;) Over fifty agents were employed to conduct all manner of “dirty tricks”:
Following members of Democratic candidates’ families and assembling dossiers on their personal lives; forging letters and distributing them under the candidates’ letterheads; leaking false and manufactured items to the press; throwing campaign schedules into disarray; seizing confidential campaign files; and investigating the lives of dozens of Democratic campaign workers.93 (Note 93: Woodward and Bernstein, “FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged Democrats.”)
In spite of these early exposés, ongoing investigation, and the Nixon administration’s frustrating evasiveness, the Watergate break-in gained shockingly little traction with the public. At this stage, hardly any newspapers picked up Woodward and Bernstein’s Watergate stories that went out on the Washington Post’s newswire.94 (Note 94: Michael Schudsen, Watergate in American Memory: How We Remember, Forget, and Reconstruct the Past (Perseus Books Group, 1993),) Plenty of skepticism existed within the Washington Post as well: Bernstein was even briefly reassigned from the Watergate case, as the newspaper “could no longer spare one of its…political reporters in an election season.”95 (Note 95: Woodward and Bernstein, All the President’s Men, 29.) Indeed, few believed that the White House had anything to do with this “third rate burglary” in spite of Democrats’ best efforts—efforts that voters largely viewed as “hysterical, even absurd”—a sentiment also shared by the media at large.96 (Note 96: Kutler, The Wars Of Watergate, 374.) Similarly little attention was paid to the CRP’s financial and electoral shenanigans. That four of the five burglars were Cuban cast further doubt as the Washington Star falsely reported that “sources close to the investigation” declared the Watergate break-in to be the work of Cuban anti-communists, out of fear that leading Democrats were supportive of Fidel Castro.97 (Note 97: Woodward and Bernstein, All the President’s Men, 34.) Despite the lack of public interest, those leading Democrats—especially O’Brien, whose office was targeted—grew increasingly interested in what little information was uncovered and pledged to launch an inquiry into Watergate and the CRP.98 (Note 98: Coffey, “Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President,” 26.)
Whether Democrats would be able to launch their congressional inquiry would be decided on November 7, as millions of Americans cast their ballots in the 1972 elections. More than 60% would vote for Nixon, who would go on to win in every state except Massachusetts in one of the largest landslide victories in American electoral history.99 (Note 99: Max Frankel, “President Won 49 States And 521 Electoral Votes,” The New York Times, November 9, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/11/09/archives/new-jersey-pages-president-won-49-states-and-521-electoral-votes.html, accessed June 30, 2023.) Crucially, however, Republicans had failed to win either chamber of Congress, even losing two seats in the Senate. This was in part Nixon’s own doing. The CRP had raised vast sums of money, which was now public knowledge as a result of the GAO’s report. Additionally, much of the CRP’s financial success had come at the expense of other Republican fundraising efforts, but Nixon expressly forbade the CRP from distributing any of its coffers to the “cash-starved [congressional] Republican candidates.”100 (Note 100: Coffey, “Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President,” 32.) The Committee for Re-electing the President would do exactly that—and only that. Congressional Republicans would remember this when Democrats launched their promised inquiry.
The looming Senate inquiry was not the White House’s only headache. Earlier that September, Liddy, Hunt, and the Watergate burglars had been indicted on multiple counts of burglary, conspiracy, and interception of wire and oral communications.101 (Note 101: Stanley Kutler, The Wars Of Watergate, 372.) Their trial began only a few months after the election on January 10, 1973, with Judge John Sirica presiding, nicknamed “Maximum John” for his harsh sentencing.102 (Note 102: Ibid.) Recognizing the weakness of their case, Hunt and the four Cuban burglars quickly pled guilty on January 11 and were subsequently released on bail; Liddy and McCord did not, and both were found guilty on January 30.103 (Note 103: Ibid.) All, however, attempted to downplay their connections with the White House: the Cubans claimed that they were anti-communists acting “on behalf of Cuban liberation”; Hunt denied any knowledge of “higher-ups” and insisted he had acted “in the best interest of my country”; McCord and Liddy offered what Sirica called the most “ridiculous” argument by claiming that they believed the burglary was “necessary…in order to protect [CRP] officials from bodily harm.”104 (Note 104: Ibid., 372-373.) Sirica was deeply skeptical of these seemingly conflicting motives: “I am still not satisfied that all the pertinent facts that might be available…have been produced before [this] jury.”
Sirica believed that the Senate might “get to the bottom of what’s happened in this case.”105 (Note 105: John J. Sirica, To Set the Record Straight: The Break-in, the Tapes, the Conspirators, the Pardon (New York: Norton, 1979), 61-90, as quoted in Kutler, The Wars Of Watergate, 372.) This would prove prophetic: in the wake of Nixon’s electoral triumph and general popularity, the Watergate trial proceeded without much media attention. Newspapers treated it as a “commonplace criminal event.”106 (Note 106: Kutler, The Wars Of Watergate, 374.) The defendants’ stonewalling and misdirection appear to have succeeded in drawing attention away from the Nixon administration. Indeed, historian Stanley Kutler notes that “Watergate might have remained as the story-that-never-was had it not been for the determination of [Senators] Mike Mansfield and Sam Ervin.”107 (Note 107: Ibid.) On February 5, 1973, Ervin introduced a resolution for the creation of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, also known as the Watergate Committee.108 (Note 108: Sam J. Ervin Jr., “A Resolution to Establish a Select Committee of the Senate to Conduct an Investigation and Study of the Extent, If Any, to Which Illegal, Improper, or Unethical Activities Were Engaged in by Any Persons, Acting Individually or in Combination with Others, in the Presidential Election of 1972, or Any Campaign, Canvass, or Other Activity Related to It,” 119th Cong., 1st sess., 1973, 119 Cong. Rec. 3831-3851.) It passed unanimously.109 (Note 109: Ibid., 3849.) “Had Republicans achieved…a majority,” contends historian Justin Coffey, “in all likelihood no such committee would have ever been created.”110 (Note 110: Coffey, “Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President,” 43.) Overall, Nixon’s conduct in the 1972 elections left congressional Republicans both largely unable and unwilling to intervene on Nixon’s behalf. Nevertheless, a few attempts were made to limit the Watergate Committee’s unprecedentedly broad scope; all would fail as Republicans found themselves routinely outvoted.111 (Note 111: Kutler, The Wars Of Watergate, 375-377.)
The unanimous approval for the creation of the Watergate Committee, while a coup for Democrats, cast a pall over the White House: “Much of the post-election brazenness and euphoria had evaporated, and Nixon warily glimpsed the future.”112 (Note 112: Ibid., 379.) A similar sentiment gathered on the judicial front, as “Maximum John” proved his moniker’s accuracy. The Nixon administration’s cover-up relied heavily upon the intransigence of the burglars, Hunt and Liddy, but as they faced years in prison, a weak link emerged. McCord, who had pled not guilty and as a result was likely to receive a harsher sentence, sent a letter to Sirica on March 19, 1973.113 (Note 113: Ibid., 381-382.) Here, among other things, McCord revealed that defendants were pressured to remain silent by pleading guilty; perjury had occurred in the trial; the individuals involved in the break-in were not identified, “when they could have been by those testifying”; and it was in no way a CIA operation.114 (Note 114: James W. McCord, Jr., Letter to Judge John Sirica, March 19, 1973, filed in United States v. George Gordon Liddy, et al., C.R. 1827-72, United States District Court for the District of Columbia; Records of District Courts of the United States, Record Group 21; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.) In his memoirs, Sirica points to McCord’s letters as a vital turning point in accelerating Nixon’s downfall by pinning Watergate directly on the White House, but by that point, historian Stanley Kutler notes that the “cover-up already had begun to fray.”115 (Note 115: Kutler, The Wars Of Watergate, 384.)
Similarly, the media’s indifference finally began to melt as revelations heated up: “‘Watergate’ rapidly became a meaningful—and loaded—political term that spread across the nation, raising far reaching political concerns.”116 (Note 116: Ibid., 397.) Where weeks earlier newspapers had only bothered to cover Watergate as a “commonplace criminal event,” they now attacked with vigour: in March of 1973, White House reporters asked 478 questions on Watergate alone.117 (Note 117: Ibid.) Another newspaper, the Republican Illinois Rockford Morning Star “recognized the transformation of Watergate from an imbecilic bugging to more a case of high-level government dishonesty.”118 (Note 118: Ibid.) Watergate was no longer just a Beltway affair, but a real concern for even America’s Republican heartland. However, in view of the whole scandal, the media’s attention came incredibly late. Months earlier, the GAO had already publicly requested a Justice Department inquiry into the CRP’s money laundering: Woodward and Bernstein had already reported that this laundered money was used to finance a vast—and most definitely illegal—campaign of “dirty tricks,” and the Watergate burglars, Hunt, and Liddy’s connections to the CRP had already been publicly confirmed during their trial. This was the Committee to Re-elect the President; who else, other than incumbent President Nixon, were they working for to re-elect? But so long as Nixon remained popular, and the notion that he had anything to do with the CRP remained hysterical and absurd, the media at large would insinuate nothing. It was ironically when the media began to pay attention to Watergate that its relative influence—its ability to drive public discussion forward with novel information—declined most precipitously. There was no point for informants to leak incriminating details to Woodward and Bernstein—and the scores of other now-interested journalists—when there now existed a Senate committee for that very purpose. The media now acted solely as a platform through which new revelations uncovered by the judiciary, the Senate, and the FBI were communicated. Tellingly, Woodward and Bernstein’s reporting on Watergate had largely ceased at this point; they were likely writing the manuscript for All the President’s Men, which would be published the next year.119 (Note 119: Woodward and Bernstein, All the President’s Men.)
On May 1, 1973, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Richard Kleindienst—the Chief of Staff, Director of the CRP, and Attorney General, respectively—resigned, whereas White House Counsel John Dean, who had up until that point played a major role in the coverup, was fired when it was revealed that he had begun cooperating with the FBI.120 (Note 120: Coffey, “Watergate and the Committee to Reelect the President,” 47.) Also in May, Kleindienst’s successor appointed Harvard Law School professor Archibald Cox to be the Special Prosecutor of the Justice Department’s investigation into Watergate.121 (Note 121: Schudsen, Watergate in American Memory, 18.) On May 17, the Watergate Committee began public, televised hearings.122 (Note 122: Stanley Kutler, The Wars Of Watergate, 481.) This would arguably have the largest impact in shifting public opinion against Nixon, as well as making the media’s attention towards Watergate permanent. From that point onwards, Americans watched damning testimony after testimony from White House officials. Chief among these was Dean’s weeklong testimony, “describing his role in the Watergate cover-up and his dealings with an extraordinary range of characters, headed, of course, by the President.”123 (Note 123: Ibid., 508.) Alexander Butterfield, a former White House aide, delivered another crucial testimony revealing the existence of a secret taping system that recorded numerous conversations involving Nixon.124 (Note 124: Ibid., 522-523.) Should the Watergate Committee come into possession of these tapes, they would have conclusive evidence to support Dean’s testimony. Nixon was quick to reject any access to the White House Tapes. The Watergate Committee responded by voting unanimously to issue a subpoena for them, and Cox followed suit, issuing his own subpoena; Nixon “respectfully” refused both.125 (Note 125: Ibid., 549.)
By the summer’s end of 1973, practically all individuals connected to the Nixon administration had testified, revealing the true extent of the administration’s abuses of power—related to Watergate or otherwise. As a result of these congressional testimonies, the public was now aware, among other things, that the Plumbers were behind the Ellsberg break-in, the White House kept an “enemies list,” and Nixon had pressured the Internal Revenue Service to investigate such “enemies.”126 (Note 126: Schudsen, Watergate in American Memory, 18.) The White House Tapes were the last missing link; both the Watergate Committee and the Special Prosecutor attempted to enforce the subpoena through legal action—but Nixon again refused.127 (Note 127: Ibid., 19-20.) Nixon’s thrice-refusal to release the tapes drained his “political sinew, his moral authority, and his credibility,” editorialized the conservative National Review—one of Nixon’s few remaining allies in the media.128 (Note 128: “Buzhardt, Garment, and Wright to the President,” National Review, August 22, 1973, as quoted in Stanley Kutler, The Wars Of Watergate, 543-544.) Instead, the White House released transcripts of the tapes with all incriminating references to Watergate scrubbed. These omissions notwithstanding, the transcripts still “astonished and outraged” the public: Nixon’s conversations were littered with vulgarity, malice, and ethnic slurs.129 (Note 129: Schudsen, Watergate in American Memory, 20.) In response, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in United States v. Nixon that the actual tapes must be released in their entirety.130 (Note 130: United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (U.S. Supreme Court 1974).) The resulting tapes included one conversation in which Nixon approved of Haldeman’s plan to end the FBI investigation by claiming that the Watergate break-in was a CIA operation.131 (Note 131: Kutler, The Wars Of Watergate, 753-756.) This “smoking gun tape,” as it came to be known, directly implicated Nixon in the cover-up attempt; impeachment was now certain.132 (Note 132: Ibid., 758.) As every member of the House Judiciary Committee declared support for impeachment—even those that had been Nixon’s fiercest defenders—Nixon saw the writing on the wall: Nixon’s presidency was finished, and he resigned on August 9, 1974. Nixon was succeeded by his Vice President Gerald Ford, who declared that “our long national nightmare is over.”133 (Note 133: Ibid., 778.) On September 8, Ford pardoned Nixon, ending investigations.134 (Note 134: Ibid., 793.)
According to Michael Schudsen’s Watergate in American Memory, two competing narratives on Watergate have emerged. One is the ubiquitous “mystery novel” narrative popularized by Woodward and Bernstein’s widely read—and now, widely watched—book and film adaptation, All the President’s Men.135 (Note 135: Schudsen, Watergate in American Memory, 21.) The other narrative, that being the scholarly interpretation of Watergate, also traces its origins to a book: Stanley Kutler’s The Wars of Watergate, which was “the first comprehensive history of Watergate by a professional historian.”136 (Note 136: Ibid.) The dissimilarities between these two narratives are in no way negligible; in broad strokes, they can be summarized by the narrative’s differing answers to one question: When does Watergate begin? Woodward and Bernstein’s account begins no earlier than the break-in. Like this essay, All the President’s Men begins with “June 17, 1972”—and hardly one paragraph after is dedicated to events prior.137 (Note 137: Woodward and Bernstein, All the President’s Men.) Subsequently, key background in regard to the Pentagon Papers, the Plumbers, and Nixon’s relationship with the press is often lost on the public at large. Here, Watergate is presented as a “detective story,” where the sleuthing press uncover clues and follow leads until eventually the weight of evidence culminates in Nixon’s resignation. In contrast, while scholarly interpretation is divided on where to begin, practically all agree that its beginnings must be placed before the break-in—such as Nixon’s failure to win Congress in 1970 and the Pentagon Papers leak in 1971.138 (Note 138: Schudsen, Watergate in American Memory, 21.) Watergate, as Kutler puts it, was “more than a burglary.”139 (Note 139: Kutler, The Wars Of Watergate, 13.) In this view, Watergate was not only a criminal case, but a constitutional crisis on the separation of powers.
Given the magnitude of Watergate’s significance, it is unsurprising that the media would seek to mythologize its role in uncovering it; public confidence is good business, after all. Watergate involved a staggering assortment of characters, events, and institutions; it remains one of the most complicated political scandals in American political history. But in one book and one movie—from the hundreds of thousands of testimonies, court proceedings, and investigations—the media forged one convenient narrative for public consumption, and in doing so, overemphasized its own role in uncovering Watergate. Compared to detective stories, the Congressional Record makes for dull reading; likewise are movies to C-SPAN. As a result, there was no room to remember the efforts of Congress and the judiciary. In popular recollection, brave journalists and bold headlines did take centre stage; Woodward and Bernstein did bring down a presidency.
But for a “remarkable account of investigatory journalism at work,” All the President’s Men contains very little original investigation.140 (Note 140: Woodward and Bernstein, All the President’s Men.) If not for a remarkable array of informants—including then-Deputy Director of the FBI Mark Felt—it is difficult to say whether Woodward and Bernstein could have gotten very far.141 (Note 141: John O’Connor, “I’m the Guy They Called Deep Throat,” Vanity Fair, October 17, 2006, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/2005/07/deepthroat200507, accessed June 30, 2023.) Indeed, practically every major exposé was leaked to the Washington Post by one government official or another. Instead, All the President’s Men is an account of just two individuals’ experiences in one newspaper—hardly indicative of the media as a whole. Cravenly shadowing the currents of public opinion, the media at large was neither courageous nor expeditious in their coverage of Watergate—or lack thereof; only when Nixon faced significant headwinds did the media begin to pay attention. Overall, our democracy is not upheld—to reluctantly borrow the words of Spiro T. Agnew— by this “tiny and closed fraternity” and an unelected one at that.142 (Note 142: Christopher Cimaglio, “A Tiny and Closed Fraternity of Privileged Men,” 1.) Rather, our democracy is only as strong as its primary institutions: the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive. Should any one of those stray from democracy’s path, salvation must come from within.